BRICS members and the migration challenge = Страны БРИКС и вызовы миграции by Korobkov, A. V.
© Tractus Aevorum 2 (2) . Fall/Winter 2015: 190–203 
 
190 
ISSN 2312-3044 | http://ta.bsu.edu.ru 
 
BRICS MEMBERS AND THE MIGRATION CHALLENGE 
 
Andrei V. Korobkov 
Middle Tennessee State University 
 
Abstract. While BRICS is quickly evolving, significant differences remain 
in the socio-economic structures, and the dynamics and goals of economic 
development of its member states. Migration represents one of the areas in 
which BRICS countries can have mutually complementary structural 
characteristics and goals of development, allowing for the formulation of 
coherent common policies. In particular, the formation of a system 
regulating various types of legal labor (highly skilled, educational, and low 
skilled) migration flows and preventing illegal migration within BRICS as 
well as the formulation of common policies in regard to migration 
exchanges with third countries is desirable. Of special importance is policy 
coordination in the field of highly skilled and educational migration, 
providing for a more effective use of BRICS members’ human capital and 
enhancing their cooperation in the fields of science, technology, and 
education. 
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УДК 327.7 
 
СТРАНЫ БРИКС И ВЫЗОВЫ МИГРАЦИИ 
 
Аннотация. Несмотря на быстрое развитие БРИКС, по-прежнему 
значительны различия между странами-членами в социально-
экономической структуре, а также в динамике и целях 
экономического развития. Миграция представляет собой одну из тех 
сфер, в которых страны БРИКС дополняют друг друга по 
структурным характеристикам и целям развития, что позволяет 
формулировать согласованную совместную политику. В этом русле 
представляются целесообразными формирование системы 
регулирования различных типов легальной трудовой миграции 
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(высококвалифицированной, образовательной и низкоквалифици-
рованной) и предотвращения нелегальной миграции в рамках БРИКС, 
а также разработка совместной политики в отношении обмена 
мигрантами с третьими странами. При этом особое значение имеет 
координация политики в области высококвалифицированной и 
образовательной миграции, которая способствует как более 
эффективному использованию странами-членами БРИКС 
человеческого капитала, так и усилению их сотрудничества в сфере 
науки, технологий и образования. 
 
Ключевые слова: БРИКС, миграция, экономическое развитие, 
трудовая миграция, высококвалифицированная миграция, 
образовательная миграция.  
 
 
In recent years, BRICS has started to become a symbol of a slow, but 
consistent power shift away from the North Atlantic to the emergent 
powers of Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. Its creation was quite 
indicative of the concern of a worldwide community of states with a post-
Cold War global order dominated by the Global North.  
BRICS brings together five large and economically important 
states—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Unfortunately, 
both their socio-economic structures and the dynamics and goals of 
their economic development differ significantly, complicating the 
formulation of coherent common policies. Thus, finding areas of 
mutually compatible interests would significantly enhance their future 
cooperation. Among these are science, technology, education, and 
migration. 
 
The Capacity for Cooperation in Migration Sphere 
Migration, in particular, represents one of the critical issues for all 
BRICS members, indicating the existence of a number of common 
problems and policy goals, even though their migration challenges vary 
significantly. At present, the migration phenomenon has acquired a truly 
worldwide importance: In 2013, 232 million people or about 3 percent of 
the world population, were international migrants.1 Of these, 136 million, 
or nearly 59 percent came to developed countries, and 96 million, or 41 
percent, to developing ones.2 In addition, hundreds of millions of people, 
among them more than 229 million in China (including about 200 million 
                                                 
1 United Nations. “Population facts.” 2013. United Nations Report, September.  
2 United Nations. “International Migration Report 2013.” 2013. United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division, December, 1.  
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who moved without obtaining a necessary permission),3 migrated within 
their countries. A significant share of these people either moved across the 
border in violation of the existing legislation or violated the law in some 
other way: overstayed their visas, engaged in activities not allowed by their 
status,4 or took up residence or employment in violation of their 
immigration status, thus becoming the irregular, informal, undocumented, 
or, as it is frequently said, illegal migrants.5   
In the case of the Russian Federation (RF), following the dissolution of 
the USSR in 1991, the country has quickly become the center of the 
second-largest immigration system in the world. 12.3 million of current 
Russian residents were born outside the country,6 (compared to more than 
45 million in the US, including 11 million illegals, the largest immigrant 
receiving state).7 Simultaneously, since 1991, more than 1.3 million 
Russian citizens obtained permits for permanent emigration to the West 
(Vishnevskii 2006, 325).  
Migration also plays the major role in the development of other BRICS 
countries, representing some of the major players in the fields of both low 
qualified and skilled migration as well as migrant remittances. From 2000 to 
2010, Russia was ranked fourth in the world in terms of annual net 
immigration (389,000), and South Africa—sixth (247,000), while India and 
China ranked respectively third and fourth among the world's emigration 
countries (with annual net losses of 490,000 and 418,000).8 These 
circumstances create a significant potential for their cooperation in this field.  
The migration dynamics in the five BRICS states is such that they play 
all three possible roles in the world migration chain, as countries of 
emigration and immigration, as well as transit states—the jumping pads 
for migrants who are trying to move to one’s territory in order to go from 
                                                 
3 United Nations. “Global Migration: Demographic Aspects and Its Relevance for 
Development.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population 
Division. Technical Paper No. 2013/6, 17. 
4 According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, in 2007, even among the migrants with 
legal work permits, 53 percent worked without a formal contract in shadow jobs 
(Tyuryukanova 2008).  
5 It is worth mentioning, meanwhile, that the latter term is not technically correct because the 
majority of irregular migrants cross borders in order to engage in labor activities, not to 
commit crimes per se. Frequently, states themselves criminalize activities that are essentially 
legal and useful for the receiving societies through their legislative and executive actions.      
6 The World Bank. 2010. The Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. 2nd ed. Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank, 1. 
7 The White House report in May 2011 has cited a figure of 10.8 million illegals in the United 
States (The White House. 2011. Building a 21st Century Immigration System. Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, 27). 
8 United Nations. “International Migration Report 2013.” 2013. United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division, December, 13.  
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there to a third country. Besides that, while Russia's population is quickly 
declining (from 148 million in 1991 to 142 million at present),9 China, 
India, and Brazil have huge surplus populations, a fact that opens the 
doors for potential cooperation in the field of labor migration.10 
Nevertheless, only in two territorially contiguous countries do there exist 
significant labor migration flows within BRICS: the relatively large-scale 
migration flow from China to the RF and migration (primarily irregular, 
and thus poorly documented) between India and China.  
Characteristically, the scale of Chinese legal labor immigration to 
Russia is quickly growing. During 2001-09, the number of Chinese legally 
employed in Russia has increased sevenfold, with China now the largest 
supplier of labor to the RF from outside the post-Soviet region, and the 
third largest (after Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) overall. In 2011, the Chinese 
share in immigrant inflow to Russia from outside the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) was 18.3 percent (Vishnevskii 2013, 481). The 
highest up-to-date number of legally registered Chinese labor migrants 
was 281,700 in 2008, while the overall number of Chinese in the RF is 
currently estimated at between 200,000 and 600,00011).  
 
The Compatibility Issue  
Even though migration flows within BRICS are limited in scale, there 
exists a number of important parallels among member states in terms of 
their migration situations and policy challenges. These circumstances 
create a need for states to both analyze each other’s migration policies and, 
potentially, to try to capitalize on their mutal compatibility in the migration 
sphere. Among the similarities, of particular interest are the following: 
1. All BRICS members are dealing with large-scale migration flows of 
various types, both legal and illegal (irregular), external and internal. As 
mentioned previously, Russia ranks second in the world in terms of the 
number of immigrants on its territory. South Africa’s migrant population 
was estimated at between 4.5 and 5.7 percent of the population.12 In India, 
                                                 
9 An additional problem for Russia is the fact that, contrary to popular perception, the human 
and labor resources of the CIS are not unlimited. Their overall capacity does not exceed 9-10 
million. In addition, a number of CIS states, primarily Kazakhstan, have started to compete 
with Russia for labor resources, particularly highly qualified workers. Thus, with time, the RF 
will have to look for alternative labor migrant sources (Vishnevskii 2011, 282).  
10 In the last twenty-five years, the following migration corridors were at different times 
ranked among the ten numerically most important in the world: China–USA, India–USA, 
India–United Arab Emirates, Russia–Germany, and China–Republic of Korea (United Nations. 
“International Migration Report 2013.” 2013. United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs. Population Division, December, 6). 
11 Vishnevskii 2006, 346; 2011, 278-9; Mukomel and Pain 2006, 25-6, 104. 
12 International Organization for Migration. “The Migration: Read All about It”; Soami Mablala 
2013. 
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the 2001 census listed 6.2 million immigrants.13 Meanwhile, India ranks 
first in terms of the number of natives living abroad, with this number 
doubling between 1990 and 2013. 14 million Indians constantly live 
outside its borders, in 2013 surpassing Mexico, the former leader, while 
Russia and China rank third and fourth respectively (Inkpen 2014).  
2. All five states are encountering a large-scale, long-term brain drain 
both through educational emigration and the direct outflow of qualified 
professionals, leading to the significant loss of a highly qualified labor force 
and financial losses associated with budgetary expenditures on education 
in the home countries.14 The size of the Russian intellectual diaspora 
abroad is estimated at between 150,000 and 200,000 (Korobkov 2014, 
143). While emigration from India to the US essentially started just after 
World War II, by the beginning of the current century, 300,000 high tech 
experts and 35,000 physicians of Indian origin were working in the US. In 
2011, 339,000 Chinese students studied overseas, while about 292,000 
foreign students studied in China.15 By 2012, more than 2.6 million 
Chinese students completed their education abroad, but only 1.09 million 
returned home. In 2011, 179,000 Chinese and 102,000 Indian students 
studied in the US. At the same time, just 1,376 US students went to study 
in South Africa, 1,243 to India, and less than a thousand to China.16 
This situation causes serious irritation on the part of the sending 
countries, leading, in particular, to demands to stop or slow down brain 
drain through such potential mechanisms as limits on exit from those 
countries, requirements to pay back tuition provided by the state, and, in 
cases of temporary migration, to leave apartments and other property as a 
collateral for educational grants and loans.   
Simultaneously, within the BRICS group, India and China have 
already developed policies and are actively working on both upholding ties 
with their elite diasporas abroad and bringing back some of these 
individuals. In particular, India has introduced the Overseas Citizenship of 
India (OCI)—a non-resident ID card for Indians and their descendants 
permanently living abroad, allowing them to travel visa free and to take 
professional jobs, as well as guaranteeing them some property rights. 
                                                 
13 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Office of the Registrar General and Census 
Commissioner, India. Census of India 2011: Migration. 
14 On average, relatively poor countries invest up to $50,000 in the training of a university 
graduate and consequently have to absorb financial losses in the case of his or her emigration 
(“Brain Drain or Brain Bank?: The Impact of Skilled Migration on Poor-country Innovation.” 
2008. National Bureau of Economic Research working paper series, December).      
15 United Nations. “Global Migration: Demographic Aspects and Its Relevance for 
Development.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population 
Division. Technical paper No. 2013/6, 19; Institute of International Education. 2012. “Open 
Doors, Project-Atlas of Student Mobility.” New York: Institute of International Education.  
16 UNESCO Institute of Statistics. “Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students.” 2011.   
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Starting in 2010, China has offered guaranteed jobs and substantial 
bonuses to returning highly-qualified professionals and Chinese students 
studying abroad. RF authorities are also actively exploring various ways of 
working with the Russian intellectual diaspora, including the creation of 
the Skolkovo Innovation Center and the Russian World Foundation. 
All five BRICS members are actively exploring ways to stimulate the 
inflow of international students and simplify legal procedures for both 
highly-qualified migrants and those applying for permanent immigration 
status as investors in the BRICS national economies. In particular, 1,100 
German, 900 British, 850 American, 800 French, 530 Turkish, and 520 
Chinese highly-qualified specialists are presently working in the RF.17 In 
China, between August 2004 and December 2011, 4,752 foreign citizens 
received permanent residency, of whom 1,735 were highly-qualified 
specialists. The major problems in this field are frequently related to the 
complexity of obtaining legal immigration status, a work permit, and legal 
recognition of their educational diplomas in the host countries. Thus, the 
potential of the immigrant labor force is not fully used. Meanwhile, more 
than 43 percent of migrants who came to Russia in 2009 from the CIS and 
Georgia had a professional education, including 18.3 percent who had 
university diplomas or some university education (Vishnevskii 2011, 258). 
Of those, 36.3 percent were willing to remain in Russia permanently, 
compared with 27.1 percent for the general immigrant population. In 
turn, Brazil issued 56,000 work visas for highly-qualified professionals in 
2011 (Lyul’ko 2011).  These policies need to be thoroughly studied by all 
group members. In addition, intellectual migration represents one of the 
areas in which the development of common national practices and policies 
toward other BRICS members, as well as the third countries, aimed at the 
formation of a common market of elite labor force—the area currently 
totally dominated by the Global North—are both possible and quite 
desirable. 
3. As mentioned, besides being simultaneously the countries of 
emigration and immigration, many BRICS members also serve as the 
jumping pads for transit migrants trying to reach the more developed 
countries of the Global North. This multiplicity of roles is especially visible 
in the cases of Russia and South Africa, with the latter type of migration 
creating significant social, health, and security threats to the host states. 
In the case of Brazil, quick reversal of its traditional role of a labor 
emigration country to that of a migrant receiving state is quite remarkable. 
Starting in 2011, the number of immigrants exceeds that of emigrants. The 
large-scale return of many Brazilians, whose numbers abroad have 
declined from four to two million, is also visible (Lyul’ko 2011). In China, 
too, the quick numerical decline after 1990 of the twenty to thirty-four 
year-old population group due to restrictive demographic policies and 
quick urbanization could, in the long run, lead to the reversal of roles for 
                                                 
17 “From Brain Drain to Brain Gain.” 2014. Russia Direct Quarterly Report 5, 23.    
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that country. Thus, in the future, the PRC could also become a net receiver 
of migrants.18 The recent rejection of the One Child policy testifies to the 
seriousness of this demographic shift. 
4. All the BRICS states represent important actors in the area of 
international remittances, though their roles in this area differ. While 
Russia and South Africa19 belong to a group of significant migrant 
remittance-sending states,20 China, India, and Brazil are among the most 
important states receiving migrant remittances. India, in particular, 
accounts for about 10 percent of remittances sent to the home countries of 
migrants worldwide (Khadria 2010, 181). Not of least importance is the 
issue of “social” remittances: the flow of ideas and practices between the 
host and home countries of migrants (Faist 2010, 65). Considering the 
scale of migration encountered by BRICS states and the size of their 
diasporas, the impact of this factor on their development should not be 
underestimated. 
5. All five states encounter serious problems related to illegal 
migration from neighboring states into their territory. Estimates of the 
number of illegal migrants on Russian territory vary significantly, from  
2.1 million21 to 3–5 million.22 The expert consensus estimate currently is 
2.4 million,23 while the overall number of labor migrants (both legal and 
illegal ones) on Russian territory is between 3.8 and 6.7 million.24 In 
                                                 
18 United Nations. “Global Migration: Demographic Aspects and Its Relevance for 
Development.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population 
Division. Technical paper No. 2013/6, 17. 
19 Remittances from South Africa in 2013 were estimated at $1,123 million (International 
Organization for Migration. “The Migration: Read All about It.”). 
20 On the Russian borders, Tajikistan has become the leader in world remittance rankings 
with nearly half of its GDP (48 percent) provided by officially recorded remittances ($4.1 
billion in 2013). The Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova are ranked third and fifth with 31 and 
24.5 percent respectively (The World Bank. “Migration and Remittance Flows in Europe and 
Central Asia: Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013-2016”). For the world economy in general, the 
size of remittances was about $400 billion in 2012 (Lobzeva 2012). UNDP estimated that 
remittances were received by about 500 million people worldwide (United Nations 
Development Programme. Human Development Report 2007: Human Development and 
Climate Change. New York: UNDP).  
21  Romodanovskii, K. O. 2012. Vystuplenie direktora FMS Rossii na zasedanii Pravitel'stva 
RF, 9 avgusta [Presentation by the Federal Migration Service Director to the Meeting of 
Government of the Russian Federation, August 9]. 
22 Kontseptsiia gosudarstvennoi migratsionnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2025 
goda, utverzhdena Prezidentom RF 13 iiunia 2012 goda [The State Migration Policy Concept 
of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2025. Approved by the President June 13, 
2012], pp. 22 e), 23 zh); Mukomel 2005, 51.  
23 Konsensus-otsenka chislennosti trudovykh migrantov v Rossii [Consensus Estimate of 
Labor Migrants in Russia]. 2010. April 9 (Konsensus-otsenka 9.4.0). 
24 Mukomel 2013, 6. 
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China, while the official number of foreigners who visited the country in 
2012 was 27.2 million, including 2.9 million who came officially to work, 
some alarmist estimates speak of up to 50 million illegals (mostly in the 
south of the country, and primarily from neighboring states, as well as 
Pakistan and Africa), although the methodology of these calculations is not 
quite clear. In 2012 alone, the Chinese authorities expelled about 200,000 
illegals from the PRC. In Brazil, the number of illegal migrants is estimated 
at between 600,000 and two million.25 For its part, South Africa has 
deported more than a million illegal migrants in the 1990s and the first 
half of the 2000s.26 
6. All five BRICS states are facing serious problems related to human 
trafficking, a phenomenon that results in the expansion of the number of 
people located outside the legal space, the proliferation of organized crime, 
growing corruption, child abuse, and sexual and other types of exploitation 
of human beings. In addition, human trafficking is increasingly associated 
with drug and weapons smuggling. It creates serious security breaches, 
offering new potential channels for the movement of terrorist and 
organized crime groups and illegal financial transfers aimed, in particular, 
at financing various illegal activities, including terrorism.27 
The problems of illegal immigration and human trafficking are widely 
publicized and not infrequently exaggerated by the media, governmental 
authorities, and political activists. In general, both immigration and 
emigration represent highly controversial issues causing serious tensions 
within the receiving societies. Among the most contentious issues in regard to 
immigration are: 1) fears of the erosion of local cultures and ethnic and 
religious unity in receiving societies; 2) the influx of undocumented migrants 
existing in a legal gray zone; 3) growing pressures on the labor market28 and 
social welfare services; 4) loss of funds through migrant remittances to their 
home countries; and 5) proliferation of crime and corruption, as well as 
national security threats. In regard to emigration, major attention is usually 
given to: demographic losses related to the departure of young and ambitious 
people; the outmigration of professional and intellectual elites, and the 
respective financial losses incurred on their education and training; and the 
associated drain on countries' educational, research, industrial, and military 
                                                 
25 Among them, Bolivians comprise 40%; Chinese, 13%; Peruvians, 11%; and the citizens of 
Paraguay, 10% (Lyul’ko 2011; Coelho 2013).    
26 Peberdy and Crash 2007, 181.  
27 It should be noted that the phenomena of illegal migration and human trafficking, 
encountered currently by BRICS countries, have long become realities of the modern world. 
At least one in two people entering the US and Western Europe is doing so in violation of 
existing laws and regulations. Crime groups involved in human trafficking make between $10 
and $12 billion annually (Ghosh 2007, 98). 
28 In South Africa, for instance, the share of foreign workers in the country’s mining industry has 
increased from 40% in the late 1980s to 60% in the mid-2000s (Peberdy and Crash 2007, 179).  
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potential. Under crisis conditions, immigration, especially illegal immigration, 
can act as an important destabilizing factor triggering ethnic tensions and 
even violent riots. A number of such events took place in South Africa, 
especially in May 2008, with violence directed primarily against migrants from 
Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, and, on a much smaller scale, in 
Russia.  
Thus there exist both common migration challenges and a potentially 
high degree of compatibility of BRICS labor markets. No less important are 
the external aspects of migration policy: immigration from neighboring 
states can serve for most of the BRICS countries as a very important 
means of stabilizing the socio-economic situation on their borders through 
such mechanisms as migrant remittances,29 the lowering of demographic, 
social services, and labor market pressures in the home states, the offering 
of education and professional skills to the migrants from these states, and 
a major “soft power” political tool.30 This latter function should be based 
on educating as well as indoctrinating incoming migrants, offering them 
new skills and making them agents of the receiving states' economic, 
political, and cultural influence in their home countries.  
The existence of the aforementioned similarities and challenges opens 
the doors for a thorough discussion of available policy options and creates 
the potential for future cooperation in the migration sphere, including the 
formation of a system regulating various types of legal labor (highly skilled, 
educational, and low skilled) migration flows within BRICS as well as the 
formulation of common policies in regard to migration exchange with third 
countries, a practice that has already become typical for many integrative 
groupings. One characteristic example in this sense is the policy of the 
European Union, which has created two drastically different migration 
regimes: a prohibitive Fortress Europe for external immigration and a 
liberal Europe without Borders for internal migration within the 
Schenghen Zone.  
 
Migration and Technological Cooperation and Development 
Another worldwide trend is the formation of a global and highly 
competitive qualified labor market, with BRICS states being its very 
important participants, at least for now primarily as suppliers of skilled 
migrants.  In general, the field of science and technology offers significant 
opportunities for international and regional organizations to set up 
international agendas. These areas are highly integrated with issues of 
skilled, educational, and, to some extent, investment-based migration.  
                                                 
29 Transfers from Russia, for example, account for approximately 60% of all migrants’ 
transfers received by the CIS countries (Vishnevskii 2006, 347-8). 
30 “Soft power” is defined by Joseph Nye as one's ability to “get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's 
culture, political ideals, and policies…[and thus] rests on the ability to shape the preferences 
of the others.” (Nye 2004, x, 5). 
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For a long time, the developed countries of the Global North held the 
dominant position in this process. The US and the United Kingdom alone 
generate more than $20 billion annually through international students’ 
tuition and living expenses.31 Relying on the LIEO model, strictly 
controlling the transfer of modern technology through such mechanisms 
as TRIPS, and aggressively recruiting intellectual elites worldwide, the 
Global North has protected its monopolistic position in this sphere.32 In 
2005, between one-third and one-half of the developing world’s science 
and technology personnel lived and worked in the OECD countries (Faist 
2010, 69).   
Meanwhile, the expansion of university education, along with the 
digital revolution, create new opportunities for the newly emergent powers. 
These countries and their organizations are becoming a new source of 
international actors and agendas able to challenge the western academic 
and technological hegemony. BRICS countries play an important role in 
this process. For example, while the number of Russian students in the 
West remains relatively low (it is currently estimated at between 35,000 
and 50,000, compared to the overall figure of more than three million 
students studying abroad worldwide, i. e. about 1.5 percent of the overall 
international student body),33 the RF is becoming an important provider of 
educational services to international students: their number reached 
123,515 in the 2010-11 academic year, compared to 95,781 in 2007-08 
and 67,025 in 1995-96.34 China, in turn, has managed to drastically 
increase the number of the foreign students studying in the country from 
80,000 to 330,000 just in the past decade.35 This is one of the areas 
                                                 
31 “From Brain Drain to Brain Gain.” 2014. Russia Direct Quarterly Report 5, 6. In the US in 
2008-2009, education funding for over two-thirds of the 671,000 international students was 
financed primarily by students’ “personal and family” sources, while US sources supported 
just 24.4 percent of students (Institute of International Education. 2009. “Open Doors 2009: 
Report of International Educational Exchange.” Washington, DC: Institute of International 
Education).  
32 Currently, six out of ten innovators migrating worldwide are moving to the United States, 
while the number of innovators moving there for permanent settlement is fifteen times higher 
than those moving out. In India’s case, 80 percent of its migrating knowledge workers, 
primarily IT professionals, are moving to the US.  Among the leaders in terms of the number 
of emigrating innovators, India ranks first, China second, and Russia seventh. And at the 
same time, India, Russia, and Brazil still show a nearly zero inflow of innovators (“Inventor 
Data for Research on Migration and Innovation: A Survey and a Pilot.” 2014. Economic 
Research Working Paper No. 17. World Intellectual Property Organization Economics and 
Statistics Series; “From Brain Drain to Brain Gain.” 2014. Russia Direct Quarterly Report 5, 7; 
Khadria 2010, 178).       
33 Of those, 17 percent went to the universities in the United States (“Summing up 
international student mobility in 2014.” ICEF Monitor) 
34 Federal’naia Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki. 2011. Rossiia v Tsifrakh 2011 [Russia in 
Figures 2011]. 
35 “From Brain Drain to Brain Gain.” 2014. Russia Direct Quarterly Report 5, 15.    
Andrei V. Korobkov. BRICS Members and the Migration Challenge 
 
200 
opening serious prospects for cooperation within BRICS. China, for 
example, ranks fifth overall and first among states from outside the CIS in 
terms of the number of foreign students studying at Russian universities 
(9,055 in 2011), while India, with 4,286 students, ranks respectively 
seventh and second. Neither state, however, is among the ten largest 
recipients of Russian students).36   
Thus, BRICS cooperation in the fields of technical and higher 
education, academic development, science, technology and innovation is 
closely linked to the issues of highly skilled and educational migration. 
Their promotion will enhance both academic and educational cohesion 
within the organization and allow for cross-national policy and 
technological transfer. Under these circumstances, it is important to: 1) 
provide for the mutual compatibility of educational programs (including 
online) and the convertibility of the national diplomas within the 
organization; enhance the academic and educational exchanges within 
BRICS; 2) stimulate the development of joint research projects in the most 
advanced academic areas, including aerospace engineering, biotech, 
chemical engineering, transportation, computer and energy technologies; 
and 3) create a favorable technological tranfer regime within BRICS, 
resisting any external attempts to dictate the conditions of such a transfer 
and technological cooperation to its members. 
 
*   *   * 
While BRICS has yet a long way to go to become an effective 
mechanism for policy-specific action, current developments, including 
western sanctions against Russia in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine, 
indicate that the organization has a significant potential. In particular, it 
can act as a mechanism allowing the emergent powers to harmonize both 
their not infrequently competing economic and political objectives and to 
formulate common policies directed at challenging the long-standing 
political, economic, and technological monopoly of the West, an outcome 
that would benefit not only BRICS members, but also the bulk of 
humankind. Migration represents one of the key areas in which such 
cooperation is quite possible.  
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